











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission. R E G -M A R K E T S C E N T E R
AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies





*Stuart Shapiro is assistant professor at the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers
University.R E G -M A R K E T S C E N T E R
AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies
The Reg-Markets Center focuses on understanding and improving regulation, market
performance, and government policy. The Center provides analyses of key issues
aimed at improving decisions in the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. It builds
on the success of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center. The views expressed in this
publication are those of the authors.
ROBERT HAHN
Executive Director
COUNCIL OF ACADEMIC ADVISERS
ROBERT E. LITAN, Co-Chairman
Brookings Institution




























Publications can be found at: www.reg-markets.org
© 2008 by the author. All rights reserved.Executive Summary
The past eight years have been busy ones for aficionados of the regulatory process. Not
since the late 1970s and early 1980s have as many requirements been imposed upon agencies
writing a regulation. These include the implementation of the Information Quality Act,
regulatory peer review, Executive Order 13422, and electronic rulemaking requirements
among others. Since many of these requirements were imposed by executive order or other
presidential action, the new administration will have important choices to make about whether
to weaken, maintain, or strengthen these requirements. These decisions will affect nearly every
area of regulatory policy This paper examines the Bush reforms by asking whether an
incoming administration with different regulatory priorities will find the increased presidential
power over regulatory agencies worth the other potentially deleterious effects of the reforms. I
argue that several of the Bush reforms, the use of prompt letters and control over guidance
documents will prove attractive to the Obama Administration, while others such as regulatory
peer review and the non-guidance components of Executive Order 13422 will not.1
The Future of the Bush Administration Regulatory Reforms
Stuart Shapiro
1. Introduction
The administration of President-Elect Obama will have many policy choices to
make once it takes office. Some such as policy in Iraq and legislative initiatives on
health care, will receive a great deal of attention. Others, such as regulatory policy at
EPA and OSHA, will receive some attention. Within the regulatory arena, decisions
about whether to retain, modify, or eliminate the Bush administration’s changes to the
regulatory process will receive minimal media attention.
1 However, some of these
decisions will affect policy in a wide variety of areas and deserve careful consideration.
The regulatory process changed more under George W. Bush than at any time
since the beginning of the Reagan Administration.
2 President Bush, through his
administrators of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) -- John
Graham and Susan Dudley -- added procedures to the regulatory process and expanded
the reach of the Executive Office of the President into agency information disseminations
and guidance documents.
With one or two exceptions, the changes by the Bush Administration were praised
by opponents of agency regulations and criticized by regulatory supporters. Supporters
of the changes hailed them as bringing rationality to the regulatory process and predicted
that they would lead to smarter regulations (Graham, Noe, and Branch 2006). Opponents
derided the changes as intended to make it harder for agencies to promulgate regulations
(Michaels 2008). These same groups are likely to pressure the new president to modify
or eliminate these procedures, or to strengthen them.
The most important effect of these procedures is to empower the President's
ability to oversee agencies. This is not a partisan impact. All presidents have an interest
1 It is true that one of the first announcements to come from the Obama transition team was a commitment
to review all of Bush's executive orders. The media coverage of these orders though have focused on
Executive Orders on stem cell research and abortion. See e.g. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/08/AR2008110801856.html (last viewed November 11, 2008).
2 The period 1980-1981 saw the passage of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction
Act and the issuance of Executive Order 12291 which institutionalized cost-benefit analysis in the
regulatory process.2
in ensuring that agencies take actions that support the president's policies. So, the
question facing President-Elect Obama and his top aides is whether these procedures
have costs that outweigh their benefits to the President through improved oversight. The
Bush Administration procedures vary in the extent to which they empower the President
and also vary in the magnitude of their potential negative effects.
This article examines the individual Bush Administration reforms and evaluates
the tradeoff between the gains to presidential power and the negative impacts of the
procedures. I am assuming that President-Elect Obama will see increased presidential
oversight of agencies as a positive trait as every president since Nixon, regardless of
party, has attempted to increase presidential control of agencies. The article proceeds as
follows: Section II reviews the role of procedures in the regulatory process. Section III
sets out the Bush reforms, evaluates each one, and recommends whether the new
administration should retain or discard it. Section IV offers concluding thoughts on
approaches to the regulatory process that President-Elect Obama should take.
2. Evaluating Regulatory Reforms
In both the academic literature and in political discourse, evaluations of regulatory
reforms are generally concerned with three points: One is the efficacy of the new
procedures in controlling bureaucratic decision making. Another is the degree of
improvement in the quality of regulatory outputs. The third is the length of time or
money that will be spent implementing the new reforms and whether they will delay the
issuance of regulations.
Political Control
Using procedures to influence the decision making by agency officials goes back
at least to Congressional passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
created the modern rulemaking process (McNollgast 1999). In the academic literature,
the chief proponents of the idea that making bureaucrats go through procedures when
writing rules will help ensure politically preferred outcomes has been the trio of scholars
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast – usually dubbed “McNollgast” (1987). They argue that
procedures are put in place by legislative coalitions to create a decision making3
environment that mirrors the climate in which legislatures make decisions. Creating this
environment will make it more likely that bureaucrats will make policy decisions the
same way that those who supported the enabling statute would make them.
The McNollgast argument has been subject to numerous criticisms.
3 Most
trenchant are the arguments that it slights the role of the President, who engages in
executive oversight of agency officials (Moe 1989), and the argument that the procedures
are left in the hands of future coalitions of political officials who may choose to use them
in ways contrary to those envisioned by the coalition that created them (Horn and Shepsle
1989).
While Congress created numerous regulatory procedures in the 1990s, the 2000s
have seen most regulatory reforms originate in the executive branch. The procedures put
in place by the Bush Administration all help to facilitate executive control of agencies.
Some do so directly, like Executive Order 13422, which requires political appointees in
agencies to sign off on regulatory decisions. Some do so indirectly, like the information-
quality guidelines, which give OIRA the ability to oversee agency responses to interest
group complaints about agency information disseminations.
The criticism by Horn and Shepsle (1989) remains relevant, however. The Bush
Administration will disappear in January 2009, and the myriad procedures it has put in
place will fall under the control of President-Elect Obama. The new President will be
able to use these procedures to facilitate policy goals that may be very different than
those desired by the Bush Administration that put them in place. This was demonstrated
when President Clinton used OIRA regulatory review, created by President Reagan with
deregulatory intentions, to further a pro-regulatory agenda (Kagan 2001). A crucial
component of the Obama Administration's decision whether to maintain or revoke the
Bush reforms will be the degree to which these procedures will facilitate President
Obama's ability to exercise influence over regulatory agencies and achieve his regulatory
policy goals.
3 These criticisms focus both on whether McNollgast correctly divine the intention of procedures and
whether procedures effectively accomplish the goal of influencing agency officials.4
Delaying or Ossifying the Regulatory Process
In both academic (primarily legal) and political circles, regulatory procedures
have been criticized for lengthening the regulatory process. In a seminal article,
McGarity (1992) coined the term “ossification of the regulatory process” to refer to the
purported impact of judicial-review and analysis requirements – making writing
regulations so difficult that agencies were turning away from the regulatory process.
McGarity built on work by Mashaw and Harfst (1990), who described a “retreat from
rulemaking” at the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA).
The delay argument has been a part of every debate on new regulatory
procedures. In 1946, opponents of the APA voiced concern about that notice-and-
comment would delay agency actions (Coglianese 2008). In 2003, critics of the Bush
Administration’s regulatory peer-review proposal complained that it would devastate
rulemaking at agencies that relied on scientific information.
4
The empirical evidence for regulatory delay and ossification is limited. While
Lubbers (2008) has argued that regulatory volume has decreased, Croley (2007) has
shown it remaining relatively steady. Coglianese (2008) has argued that while each new
regulatory procedure has brought fears of the demise of regulations, there is little
evidence that any such demise has occurred. Shapiro (2002) looked at regulatory
procedures on the state level and concluded that decisions to refrain from regulation were
influenced far more by politics than by the requirements of the regulatory process.
Shapiro (2007) has also found that the time to complete a regulation did not appreciably
vary between the Clinton and Bush (43) administrations.
5
Still, it is hard to argue with the intuitively plausible prediction underlying the
ossification argument. If the cost of regulating goes up, then the quantity of rulemaking
should go down or the time to complete a rule should go up. There have so many
additional procedures imposed on the regulatory process by the Bush Administration, it is
possible that a threshold has been reached and these effects will begin to manifest
themselves. In evaluating the Bush Administration procedures, I will consider the
4 See any of the negative comments on the OMB proposed peer review bulletin at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/iq_list.html (last viewed November 6, 2008).
5 Although none of the procedures in question here were in effect for the Bush regulations studied by
Shapiro.5
amount of delay they are likely to cause with a skeptical eye toward claims that the delay
will be extreme. Delay will be considered a negative aspect (although delay of bad
regulations could be seen as positive) because of the likely regulatory agenda of President
Obama.
Obtaining/Generating Better Regulations
Many procedural changes to the regulatory process have the stated purpose of
improving regulations or other regulatory documents. Much like Congress never asserts
that the purpose of legislatively imposed procedures is enhanced legislative oversight, the
President, except in rare instances, does not claim that the purpose of his reforms is
enhanced presidential power. There is often some other stated reason that the procedures
are imposed, usually with some theoretical or academic support. Such reforms are
supposed to make regulations “better,” in some meaningful way. Classically requiring
cost-benefit analysis is intended to improve the economic efficiency of regulations.
The reforms enacted over the past eight years are no different. The Bush
Administration peer-review guidelines stated that they were intended to “enhance the
quality and credibility of scientific information” supporting agency regulations. OMB
described the “primary focus” of E.O. 13422 as “improving the way the Federal
Government does business with respect to guidance documents.” Many of these reforms
are also couched in the rhetoric of increasing economic efficiency by making regulations
“smarter.”
There is considerable theoretical dispute about whether these procedures improve
regulations. Most of this dispute has centered on two of the regulatory process’s older
procedural controls: the notice-and-comment process and the requirement that agencies
conduct cost-benefit analyses. Notice-and-comment has been praised as a critical
governmental innovation (Davis 1969) and derided as “kabuki theater” (Elliott 1992).
Cost-benefit analysis has been hailed for its potential to improve the economic efficiency
of agency regulations (Hahn and Litan 2005) and criticized as likely to subvert
regulations designed to improve public health (Heinzerling and Ackerman 2005).
While much rhetoric has been directed at the impact of regulatory procedures on
actual regulations, there is little empirical evidence to support any of the competing6
hypotheses. It is probably too soon for valid empirical analysis of the Bush reforms, as
opposed merely to anecdotes about particular regulations.
6 Even for the older regulatory
procedures, like notice- and-comment and cost-benefit analysis, there is little analysis.
What analysis does exist (Shapiro 2002, Golden 1998, Hahn and Tetlock 2008) suggests
that many of these procedures play less important a role than the heated debate over their
existence suggests.
7
So should an evaluation of the Bush reforms include some criteria of whether they
make regulations “better?” One could use the economic efficiency of regulations as the
measure of the quality of regulations, although this is clearly only one of several
possibilities. However, given the lack of empirical evidence that earlier procedural
reforms have affected the substance of regulations either in the manner that their
advocates had hoped or by improving the economic efficiency of regulations, I am going
to operate under the assumption that the Bush reforms will have only a minimal impact
on the quality of regulations and that their impact regulatory substance will be limited to
the degree that they help the President impose his policy preferences
Thus we are left with only two relevant factors: delay and the impact on the
degree of executive control.
8 The analysis in section III evaluates the potential tradeoff
between executive control and delay in issuing regulations. In other words, the
dispositive question for the Obama Administration, in determining whether the Bush
reforms are worthy of retention, is whether the gain in presidential control over agency
decision making is worth a possible delay in agency completion of presidential priorities.
3. What Should Be Done With the Bush Reforms?
This section identifies the more notable reforms to the regulatory process put in
place by the Bush Administration. For each reform, I discuss the degree to which it (1)
6 This is true because many of them have not been in place long enough to generate meaningful sample
sizes of regulations affected.
7 The literature on notice-and-comment rulemaking is particularly ambiguous. Yackee (2006) argues that
comments make a difference in low salience rulemakings or when commenters agree (also see Golden
1998). Shapiro (2008) finds they make a difference in regulations dealing with technically complex issues.
Others (e.g., West 2005) find limited influence in most circumstances.
8 There may be those who argue that some of the regulatory procedures have inherent value. For example,
notice-and-comment can be supported by citing the benefits that participation has for those who participate.
To my knowledge, none of the Bush reforms have been defended with this argument so I do not include it
in this analysis.7
enhances presidential power and (2) delays regulations that the new administration may
favor. I will conclude the discussion of each reform by evaluating the tradeoff (where it
exists) between enhancing presidential power and delay and recommending whether the
reform should be retained, changed, or eliminated.
Note that this is not an analysis of whether the reforms increase social welfare.
Rather, I assess these reforms from the perspective of a President who wants to control
agency actions but disdains delay in the regulatory process. As described above, I expect
the effect of the reforms on regulatory substance or economic efficiency apart from these
two impacts to be minimal. If presidential control of agencies results in harms to
regulatory substance or democratic governance, then most of these procedures harm
overall social welfare and should be eliminated. Similarly, if regulations on average have
costs that exceed their benefits and therefore making them more difficult to issue
enhances social welfare, then most of these reforms should be maintained.
Prompt Letters
One of the earliest reforms put in place by the Bush Administration was the
creation of prompt letters by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
These letters suggest to agencies that they begin work or speed up work on a particular
regulatory effort. After several high-profile letters in 2001 (one suggesting that OSHA
encourage defibrillators in the workplace, and one urging FDA to quickly promulgate
their rule on trans-fatty acid labeling), the pace of prompt letters slowed and none were
issued after April 2006.
The prompt letters are unique among the Bush Administration reforms in that they
attempt to speed the regulatory process rather than slow it down. Hence this is the easiest
regulatory reform to evaluate. It enhances presidential control of agencies and it has the
potential to speed up the regulatory process. The next President should revive the use of
prompt letters. They are a way to call attention to issues that are presidential priorities
and overcome the torpor that occasionally bedevils agency bureaucracies.
Verdict: Keep prompt letters.8
Information Quality Act
The Information Quality Act (IQA) was passed as a rider to an omnibus
appropriations bill in the waning days of the Clinton Administration. However the IQA
was vaguely worded and the details of its implementation was the responsibility of the
Bush Administration. OIRA wrote the implementing regulations for the act and issued
final guidelines in 2002. The guidelines instruct each agency to develop its own
standards that scientific information would have to meet in order to be considered of
high/sufficient quality and set expectations for these standards; they also create a
procedure whereby members of the public can challenge information disseminated by the
agency.
9 Agencies are only supposed to use information of sufficient quality to justify
their regulatory efforts. Over 130 agencies have issued their own “information quality
guidelines” in response.
The IQA regulations were issued amidst considerable controversy. Critics feared
(and supporters hoped) that they would be used to challenge the scientific underpinnings
of regulations and delay or prevent their issuance. However, because agency disposition
of complaints under the IQA was determined to not be judicially reviewable,
10 it is not
clear that agencies have a significant incentive to make changes to their policies based on
these complaints.
Empirical analysis of the results of IQA regulations has been largely conducted by
OMB and by interest groups opposed to the Act. OMB issued a report in 2004
characterizing the number of correction requests made under the new agency quality
guidelines as “relatively small.” OMB also argued that contrary to critics' concerns, (1) it
was not only industry but also pro-regulatory groups that had requested corrections; (2)
the guidelines had not slowed down the regulatory process; and (3) the guidelines had not
chilled agencies' disseminations of information (and by implication agency regulatory
efforts) (OMB 2004). OMB Watch, a liberal watchdog group, sharply challenged these
conclusions. According to the OMB Watch report, three quarters of information
9 Different types of information are held to different standards with information used to support significant
regulations held to the highest standards. For more details see the OMB guidelines at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/iqg_oct2002.pdf (last viewed November 21, 2008).
10 Operation of the Missouri River Sys. Litig. No. 03-MD-1555 (2004).9
correction requests have in fact been submitted by industry, and the total number of
requests is triple that claimed by OMB (OMB Watch 2004; McGarity et. al. 2005).
In an update published in the 2008 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Regulations, OMB noted that agencies had received twenty-one information-
correction requests in 2007. Of these, only one has to date resulted in a correction, while
eight are still pending a determination. While parties that file a request are allowed to
appeal a denial, the 2008 OMB report also makes clear that in the absence of judicial
review, few appeals will succeed.
By any measure, the correction requests permitted by the IQA have had a minimal
impact. Without judicial review, agencies have been required to implement very few
corrections. Further, because so few requests were submitted, it is hard to argue that the
IQA has delayed regulatory efforts. The one or two instances of IQA-induced delay (e.g.,
in the regulation of Atrazine by EPA
11) that have been cited by critics of the IQA appear
to be isolated.
By requiring agencies to report information-correction requests to OMB, the IQA
regulations do enhance presidential control. They inform OMB (and hence the Executive
Office of the President) of potential concerns earlier in the regulatory process. Of course,
as there are many other avenues for OMB to learn about potential problems, it is unclear
that the IQA is necessary for this function.
Unlike many of the other Bush Administration reforms, the IQA regulations are
based in statute. If the Obama Administration wanted to change the IQA regulations,
simply revoking them would not be an option; they would have to issue new regulations
in their place. This would be more cumbersome than changing many of the other Bush
reforms. Because of the limited impact of the IQA to date, modifications are probably
not worth the effort. The Obama Administration should, however, fight any effort to
permit judicial review. In addition to eroding presidential control over agencies, judicial
review could significantly delay agency action by forcing agencies to take more time to
respond to information-quality complaints to ensure that their responses will pass judicial
muster.
11 See http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/08/28/interrogations/ (last viewed November
6, 2008).10
Verdict: Keep the guidelines but fight any effort at judicial review.
Regulatory Peer Review
The Bush Administration followed the IQA regulations with controversial
guidelines requiring agencies to subject “significant” scientific documents to expert peer
review. The guidelines outlined the peer review requirements, specifying who could
serve as a peer reviewer and identifying the categories of technical information to which
peer review would apply. After two rounds of public comment and considerable
criticism, OMB published revised guidelines in a bulletin in January of 2005.
The debate on regulatory peer review mirrored the debate on information quality,
with many of the same opponents and proponents voicing similar positions. Because the
final implementation of the peer review guidelines occurred several years later than that
of the IQA guidelines, and because it will take longer to see evidence of the effect of the
peer review guidelines, there have been no empirical analyses of regulatory peer review.
Regulatory peer review could conceivably have either pro-regulatory effects (if
peer reviewers are favorably disposed to regulation) or anti-regulatory ones (if peer
reviewers are unfavorably disposed to regulation). However, more clearly than any of
the other Bush reforms, regulatory peer review has the potential to cause significant delay
in the regulatory process. Thoughtful peer review and thoughtful responses to peer
review take time. In the academic and grant-writing contexts, peer review typically takes
three to six months. And there is every reason to think that the science underlying
regulations will be more complicated and will take more time to review than a typical
grant or academic article (Shapiro and Guston 2007).
Though it causes delay, regulatory peer review also serves the purpose of
increasing executive control over agencies. By identifying possible problems with the
science underlying a regulation, peer reviewers provide information that will be useful to
OMB in its eventual review of the regulation. However, between public comments,
information-quality correction requests, and the analyses agencies are required to perform
in support of regulations, it is likely that this information will be available from other
sources. The impact of regulatory peer review on executive oversight will be positive but
small.11
Given the extensive delay likely to result from peer review and its minimal effects
on executive control, there is little reason for a president with numerous regulatory
priorities to keep the peer-review guidelines in place. Further, revocation or suspension
of the guidelines would be easy to achieve, merely requiring issuance of a bulletin.
Taking this simple action would be beneficial to the Obama Administration.
Verdict: Revoke the peer-review bulletin.
Guidance Documents
Critics of procedural requirements imposed on regulators have long argued that
one of their impacts has been to drive agencies away from rulemaking and toward more
informal avenues of policymaking, such as the issuance of guidance documents.
Agencies claim that they issue these guidance documents to help regulated entities
comply with regulations but critics claim they impose new requirements. Reflecting this
concern, the Bush Administration proposed guidelines for agency guidance documents in
2005, and finalized them as part of Executive Order 13422 in January 2007. The E.O.
put in place, for the first time, requirements on federal agencies issuing guidance
documents. They apply to a subset of guidance documents – those that are “significant”
or “economically significant” -- and largely involve solicitation of public input and
reporting to OMB.
Before the issuance of this bulletin, guidance documents were largely outside the
reach of OMB. This bulletin is one of the Bush Administration’s largest expansions of
presidential power in the regulatory arena. It therefore clearly increases presidential
influence over agencies. Also, by raising the cost of issuing guidance documents, the
bulletin may give agencies the incentive to use the regulatory route to make policy. (This
makes sense, of course, only if one accepts the hypothesis that agencies were “retreating
from rulemaking” by, for example, issuing guidance documents.) This in turn will
increase transparency and accountability in policymaking, and as a result also enhance
President-Elect Obama’s supervision over agency actions.
The new rules for guidance documents will undoubtedly delay the release of the
most significant ones. That is, after all, its explicit intent. However, it is unlikely that top
priorities of an Obama Administration would be implemented through guidance. The12
delay would be more likely to affect documents that serve priorities of the agencies rather
than those implementing objectives of the President. Therefore, the tradeoff between
enhanced supervision and delay should be an easy one for the new President.
Verdict: Keep the guidelines on guidance documents in place.
Risk Assessment Guidelines
OMB proposed guidelines for agencies conducting risk assessments in January
2006. The risk assessment guidelines were criticized by the scientific community with
the National Academy of Sciences calling them “fundamentally flawed.” OMB withdrew
the guidelines and in their place issued a set of principles in September 2007. The
guidelines as originally proposed would have led to significant delays in some rules that
relied upon risk assessments.
The guidelines on risk assessment were also repetitive (from an executive control
standpoint) in view of the issuance of the information quality guidelines, and other long
standing regulatory procedures such as notice-and-comment and OMB review. It is
unlikely that OMB gained any additional supervisory powers under the risk assessment
guidelines that it does not have authority for elsewhere. There is little argument for
reinvigorating the risk assessment guidelines.
Verdict: Do not issue new guidelines on risk assessment.
Executive Order 13422
In January 2007, the Bush Administration issued an executive order making three
changes to the regulatory process. One of these is the enhanced oversight of agency
guidance documents discussed above. The other two changes were to require agencies to
identify a market failure on any significant regulation they issue and to require regulatory
agencies to have a presidentially appointed “Regulatory Policy Official” sign off on all
agency regulations.
Coglianese (2008) has analyzed the executive order and the controversy
surrounding it and concluded that the effects of the order will be minimal. I believe this
conclusion is true both as it pertains to regulatory delay and to presidential control.
Nothing in the order is likely to lengthen the regulatory process for agencies. While the
presence of a Regulatory Policy Official may superficially enhance presidential control,13
agency heads are already presidentially appointed and it is hard to imagine that any
significant regulatory efforts are promulgated without their approval. The presence of
one more appointee in the agency process will at most lead to minute increases of
presidential influence on a process where the Executive Office of the President already
has tremendous power.
Similarly, the change to Executive Order 12866, requiring that “Each agency shall
identify in writing the specific market failure (such as externalities, market power, lack of
information) or other specific problem that it intends to address” is also likely to have a
minimal effect. Many regulatory solutions can easily be cast as responses to market
failures
12, and it is unlikely that any regulations that the Obama Administration wants to
promulgate will be deterred or delayed by this requirement.
Verdict: It doesn't matter but for symbolic reasons, reversing the order may have
political advantages.
A Word on Electronic Rulemaking
The movement of the rulemaking process to the Internet is different than the
other reforms discussed here. Unlike many of the other procedures implemented by the
Bush Administration, the movement to electronic rulemaking is widely regarded as
inevitable and potentially beneficial by many parties regardless of ideology. Many
criticisms of the recent movement toward electronic rulemaking have involved its
implementation rather than the ideas behind it. The most strident criticisms have
described steps to implement electronic rulemaking as merely moving the current
regulatory process online (Noveck 2004).
There have many academic articles written with ideas for how the rulemaking
process could be made more participatory, more efficient, and more likely to lead to good
policy by using the internet (see e.g. Noveck 2004). In terms of the framework used in
this article to evaluate regulatory reforms, electronic rulemaking has the potential to add
delay to the rulemaking process by increasing the number of public comments that
12 Nearly all environmental regulations are responses to externalities, food and drug labeling requirements
are responses to asymmetric information problems, and species preservation examples can be seen as
provision of public goods to cite a few examples. For those regulations where the connection to a market
failure is more tenuous, agencies will likely be able to rely on the argument that the regulations are required
by statute and so are exempt from the market failure requirement.14
agencies receive. It also does little to enhance executive control of agencies (except in
the sense that making the public comment process more efficient may improve the ability
of the executive office to sense public opinion on regulatory issues).
However, given that some degree of electronic rulemaking is inevitable, any new
administration has an interest in making sure it works as well as possible. Many of the
ideas proposed by academics for electronic rulemaking are probably best tried on an
experimental basis and the Office of Management and Budget can do much to encourage
such experiments. At the same time, OMB should review electronic rulemaking efforts
to date and evaluate the criticisms of those changes already made. While not wanting to
“start over” and lose eight years of work, reforms that could be made easily and improve
efficiency should be taken.
Verdict: Undertake an evaluation of electronic rulemaking efforts to date and encourage
agency experimentation with electronic rulemaking.
4. Conclusion
It will be tempting for President-Elect Obama to attack the Bush changes to the
regulatory process with a hatchet rather than a scalpel (to borrow a phrase from the 2008
presidential debates). Many of these changes have been widely derided by the interest
groups that supported Obama's election, and the political cost of eliminating them will be
relatively small.
However, some of the Bush regulatory reforms may actually be able to help the
new president achieve his policy goals. By improving executive oversight of regulatory
agencies, President-Elect Obama will be able to better ensure that his goals for these
agencies are being achieved and that they are being achieved promptly. President Clinton
found that regulations were an important path to notable accomplishments. Being able to
successfully manage the regulatory state helps a president make public policy. Improved
oversight over guidance documents, prompt letters, and judicious implementation of
electronic rulemaking can serve as important components of a successful management
strategy.
On the other hand, several of the Bush reforms do little to enhance oversight but
have potentially deleterious effects. Regulatory peer review clearly falls in this category15
and the Information Quality Act could as well if judicial review of information
corrections was instituted. President-Elect Obama should rescind the bulletin on
regulatory peer review, the non-guidance provisions of E.O. 13422, and ensure that the
impact of the IQA continues to be small. These actions will both please his supporters
and would be the first actions ever taken to actually simplify the regulatory process.16
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